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[The following article, by economist Richard Stahler-Sholk, consists of excerpts from a paper
presented by the author at the mid-March Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Congress in
New Orleans. Stahler-Sholk is affiliated with the Regional Coordination for Economic and Social
Research in Central America and the Caribbean (CRIES), Managua. The article was provided
by CRIES- Pensamiento Propio to the Central America Resource Network (Palo Alto, Calif.)] On
February 15, 1988, a major economic stabilization and adjustment package was announced. The
package constituted a heterodox shock treatment adjustment, not unlike Argentina's Plan Austral
of 1985 and Brazil's Plan Cruzado of 1986. Key elements of the Nicaraguan plan included a major
devaluation and unification of the official exchange rate, a monetary reform, and a new schedule
of controlled prices and salaries. The overall objectives were, in the short term, to withdraw excess
money from circulation, dampen inflationary expectations, and neutralize the monetary holdings of
speculators and contras. In the medium to long term, the shock treatment measures sought to alter
the structure of relative prices in such a way as to rationalize imports, stimulate export production
and induce a shift in the workforce from informal commerce into productive sectors. The monetary
reform was announced on a Sunday night, effective the following morning. The old currency was
replaced with a "new cordoba", redeemable for 1000 old cordobas within a three-day period, with a
ceiling of 10 million old cordobas per household exchangeable in cash. The rest was placed in bank
accounts and frozen: the first 10 million (or 10,000 new cordobas) and 50% of any amount above that
available for withdrawal after one year, and the remainder after two years. The official exchange rate
was set at 10,000 (i.e., 10 new cordobas) to the dollar as opposed to the old implicit exchange rate
which ranged from 70-370 for imports and several thousands for major exports. In other words, it
was a large effective devaluation. The official salary scale rose on average by 384% (ranging from
305% at the low end of the scale to 662% at the high end), while official prices for 33 basic goods
and services rose on average by 273%. The new credit policy was not immediately promulgated,
but it was announced that outstanding debts would be revalued. A definitive evaluation of the new
measures would be premature, as policy was still unfolding at the time of this writing. However,
some preliminary reflections are possible. Looking first at the short run, the measures tend to be
recessionary, and therefore entail political costs. For this reason, there was considerable internal
debate over the timing of the measures and the relative merits of a gradual vs. shock approach.
The package was first planned for January, postponed to March, then backed up to February. The
Ministry of Agriculture (MIDINRA) presented simulations of a devaluation of the exchange rate
to 10,000 with 500% salary increases, showing that virtually all export production would become
unprofitable. The Central Bank (BCN), concerned about the inflationary implications of continued
exchange rate subsidies, countered that profitability would have to be restored in the medium
term by increasing efficiency and reducing use of imported inputs, i.e., by adjusting to the new
structure of relative prices. Supply elasticities are an unknown factor, subject to debate. Ideally,
the package should have been preceded by extensive cost studies and infrastructural planning
to facilitate shifts in production, as well as by a stockpiling of basic consumer goods to stabilize
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prices. In practice, efforts to secure a "cushion" of $300 million in foreign exchange and basic goods
from the European Economic Community and Contadora countries proved largely unsuccessful.
In contrast to Brazil's Plan Cruzado, launched with a $13 billion balance of payments surplus, the
Nicaraguan plan had limited recourse to imports as a means of stabilizing short-term supply. Nor
was the plan accompanied by an announcement of an emergency reprogramming of resources
designed to guarantee availability of basic wage goods. Assuming that production cannot respond
immediately to the drastically altered structure of relative prices, this suggests a likely short-term
drop in supply. On February 21 the government announced a 10% reduction in current expenditure
and "compacting" of personnel a policy likely to be generalized with overall unemployment already
running at 25%. Despite the short-term costs of the shock approach, there were a number of factors
arguing for quick action. To be potentially effective in the medium term, the measures had to be
announced before the start of the new agricultural cycle in April. Also, with the February 3rd vote
against contra aid in the US House of Representatives, the Reagan administration in its final throes,
contra leaders starting to resign and return to Nicaragua, and general elections scheduled for
1990, there was clearly a changing political panorama in which protracted economic chaos could
be a rallying cry for a reinvigorated coalition of right- and left-wing opposition parties, appealing
to middle sectors and urban workers mainly on the basis of economic issues. A January 1988
opposition "march against hunger" in Managua attracted some 10,000; hardly a massive turnout, but
nevertheless, significant. It is not accidental that the term "Chileanization" began to find its way into
speeches by FSLN National Directorate members. Evidently, the Frente opted for biting the bullet of
adjustment in 1988 in the hopes of stabilizing the economy by 1990. Whether that decision will hold,
however, is an open question, as the political costs may well force a retreat in terms of adjustment
and stabilization. For example, the medium and long-term supply response will depend in part on
whether the exchange rate continues to be devalued at a faster rate than inflation. In other words,
in order for the measures to actually constitute an adjustment (unlike the February 1985 package),
the prices of tradeable goods must rise in relation to non-tradeables; which, in the Nicaraguan agroexport economy, suggests that labor will be cheapened. This dilemma the internal political costs of
adjusting to an unfavorable insertion into the international economy is a structural problem that the
Central American region as a whole has faced since the 1970s. Investment policy and transformation
of the productive structure with a view toward a more viable international insertion, is another
set of medium to long-term unknowns. Given the large trade deficit, unification of the exchange
rate will create a sizable "foreign exchange fund" which could conceivably be used (instead of
printing money) to finance a rationalized investment program; but there will be political pressure
to divert these resources toward consumption. Another unknown in the medium to long-term is
whether a serious adjustment and stabilization package might encourage more foreign loans. In all
likelihood, however, the flow of external financing will continue to be determined more by political
than economic criteria. The new package is not class neutral, but its precise impact will depend on
its implementation. A number of key decisions have yet to be announced or demonstrated. The
monetary reform, effected without warning and carried out with extraordinary efficiency in the
space of three days, had the effect of capturing or nullifying large sums of money presumably in the
hands of the contras and speculators. The US embassy alone was forced to deposit over 280 million
cordobas in cash, and embassy officials scurried around Managua trying to launder millions more.
As internal prices move closer to world prices, the US government's destabilization campaign will
become more costly, since dollars funneled to opposition groups will not go as far. The decision
about frozen funds is essentially a de facto inflationary tax effected by leaving the funds deposited
for some time. In any event, the sudden withdrawal of liquidity from the economy (removing an
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estimated 11.4% held by the contras and speculators) had an immediate recessionary tendency.
It also restored overnight the role of monetary/credit policy, which in subsequent months will
involve implicit choices between levels of recession and inflation. At least nominally, this round
of restructuring of relative prices was aimed at improving the purchasing power of salaries with
respect to basic consumer goods, a difference from the Plan Austral or Plan Cruzado. The weighted
average of salary increases came to 384% while the weighted basket of 33 basic goods, whose
prices were announced on February 15, increased by only 273%. Goods and services with a high
import component or export potential (electricity, transport, sugar, toothpaste) rose much more
in price than other basic items. Of course, short-term supply problems that imply availability at
official prices might be limited, meaning that market mechanisms would take over distribution, and
commercial intermediaries might be the principal beneficiaries. However, in contrast to previous
half-hearted price control campaigns, there were some indications that greater political will existed
in 1988 to promote popular mobilization aimed at preventing the kind of speculative concentration
of income that had occurred in previous years. The days following the announcement saw levels
of direct class confrontation unseen since 1981: CDS organized marches through Managua's
marketplaces, seizing goods and forcing sale at official prices as police stood by. The extent of the
Frente's commitment to reactivate its dormant capacity for mass mobilization invoked in earlier
years for the literacy crusade and popular health campaigns remains to be seen. Without sustained
popular activism, the administrative capacity to enforce price controls simply does not exist. As
a potential focus of mobilization, the February 1988 package provided a boost in popular morale
on several counts: the psychological effects of the monetary reform carried out with such secrecy
and efficiency; the speechlessness, embarrassment, and economic losses suffered, respectively, by
"La Prensa", the US embassy, and speculators; and the apparent increase in purchasing power of
salaries vs. official prices of basic items. The political will to encourage direct action had already
been building up for several months with a series of speeches by the FSLN leadership urging
supporters to "take to the streets" to challenge opposition forces emboldened by Esquipulas and the
new political opening. On the negative side of the subjective appeal, however, the new package was
officially billed as a "defense of real wages" when in fact it represented, at best, an effort to maintain
purchasing power: 1) with reference to certain basic goods in limited quantities; 2) assuming
further reduction in non-basic consumption as well as probable layoffs; and, 3) only if the popular
sectors mobilized effectively against speculative intermediation. Failure to make these important
clarifications could translate into a significant political liability. Clarity about the implications of the
package will be particularly important in the short and medium-term, as various sectors jockey for
advantageous positions within the altered structure of relative prices. One important indicator of the
distributive thrust of the measures will be the new prices for agricultural producers. For example,
if production costs of basic grains rise significantly more than average salary increases as appears
likely a decision will have to be made whether to: 1) readjust salaries upwards; 2) fix producer prices
which would not allow for profitable production by a large sector of the peasantry; or 3) return to
the pre-1985 system of food subsidies. In sum, the February 1988 package is still indeterminate
with regard to stabilization and adjustment on the one hand, and distribution and growth on the
other hand. The definition of economic policy, as in the preceding 1981-87 period, will be strongly
influenced by the perceived need to consolidate revolutionary hegemony in the face of external
aggression. Given the destabilization campaign and structural economic constraints especially
foreign exchange limitations the material basis for simultaneously organizing military defense,
transforming the economy, and maintaining a broad alliance strategy, is overstrained. Recognition

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 3 of 4

LADB Article Id: 075071
ISSN: 1089-1560

of these dilemmas was unnecessary in 1979-81, delayed in 1982-84, and finally directly confronted in
recent years as the economic crisis intensified.

-- End --
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